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S'r.ATEl\lENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Orig-inally this was an action by Plaintiffs-Appellants 
for thr recoYrry of $13,000 plus interest and costs from 
Ddenrlant-Respondent on one of two alternatiYe theories, 
11
<1
1nr-ly, fraud and deceit or breach of contract (R. 23-25). 
111 tlir·i1 hrid ()JJ ap1wal, Plaintiffs-Appellants assert the 
action is one of promissory estoppel, an entiri·h· 1111 , 
theory from those relied upon i11 the trial court. . . 
DISPOSITION IX 'fHE LU\YER conn 
The case was tried before the Honorable ,Jo,cph r~ 
.Jep11son, sitting 1Yithout a jury. At the· elm;r ol Pb!~ 
tiffs-AppPllants' e\·idence, the Court granted Defe11i!a
11
1 
Respondent's motion for dismissal of Cou11t I ;111 ci rir 
Count II of Plaintiff-Appellants' Ampndrd Cornpl1i· 
(R. 106, 197, 150) and ju<lgment of dismissal \rith JllPJ' 
dice was e11tered under date of Ortoher 2:~. 1%+ 1[! 
59-60). 
RELIEF SOUGHT OX .\.PPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek not on!~· H'\'l'l':-nl oft' 
judgment of dismissal by the lower court but also ti• 
award by this Honorable Court of a money judgment it 
their favor (apparently onrlooking or ignoring the fa 
that the judgment of dismissal was entered at the eJ11,. 
of Plaintiffs-Appellants' evidence) or, in the alternati1· 
an order granting a new trial. 
STATE~IENT OF FAC1'S 
The factual assertions set forth iu the Stntrml'11t "1 
Facts contained in Plaintiffs-Appellants' hrid whiii 
1. l wi•i covers some twenty-four pages are so com JJllPf ' 
i! ] 't,el' argument of the case, Defcndant-RPspondrnl 11m s 1 · 
compelled to include the following stail'ment of the nlilti 
· f' ti Court rial facts of the case for the ass1stan<'<' o ir 
3 
(Ju September 28, 1962, G. H. Mickelson ·was a fran-
chised <listrihutor or dealer of trailers manufactured by 
Giud~- ( n•ferring to Gindy Manufacturing Corporation, 
n~fe11dant-Respondent herein) in a specified territory, 
including the State of Utah, pursuant to a written agree-
ment executed on or about l\Iarch 1, 1962 (R. 87, Ex. 2). 
On September 28, 1962 Mickelson called upon C. B. Petty, 
the managing partner of Petty Investment Company, a 
partnership, seeking a loan of $12,000 (R. 97). Prior to 
that time, Petty Investment Company had made loans 
to eilher Mickelson or Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc., a 
t•11rporntion of which Mickelson was President, part of 
1rhich had not been repaid as of September 28, 1962 (R. 
02-94). Tn order to obtan the new loan of $12,000, Mick-
el~o11 offered l\fr. Petty an assignment of commissions 
from Girnly on the sale of trailers in the amount of 
~11,000, of which $12,000 would be applied on the new 
loan and the remaining $5,000 on the prior indebtedness 
m 97). In support of such offer, Mickelson exhibited 
lo JI r. Petty a written document entitled ''Assignment of 
Jionies" (F,xhihit 5), to which was attached Addendum 
"A" setting forth the "deals in process" co-rnred by 
the assig-nment together with the respective dollar 
nmounts which l\Iiekelson represented he would realize 
from ead1 one and the total of $44,300 (R. 98). 
In an effort to confirm the commissions represented 
hy Mickelson, Mr. Petty then contacted the Gindy office in 
Pennsylrnnia either hy telegram or telephone (R. 98, 
iu:i; a11d inquir0d if the assignment in the amount of 
~li.000 wr111Jd lw honored and if it was in order (R. 98, 
4 
110). The \\Ti tten "Assignment of Monies" prepared 
111 
.'.\lickelson was not thl•n available to the Gi11 .1,. fii' · · u. o e1a1, 
being in the hands of :\liekelsou and Petty in 8alt Lal· 
City, Utah. :\Ir. Petty recPiw<l an imme<liate rqih i" 
such inquiry that saml' day in the> form of a telegram 
from :\Ir. S. E. '\V alters, .Jr., Treasu n•r of GilHl)·, dat1,, 
September 28, Hl62 and ad<lre:,;sed to l'etty fow,tm,.:
1 
Company, a ('Opy of which is Exhibit 1 in thi.~ matt,.1 
( R. 98-99). Said te leg-ram reatls as follows: 
"WILL WITHHOLD FIHST 8EVK\'Tlm 
THOUSAND DOLLARS TN CO:\DllSSIOX T11 
FREEWAY AND OR G. H. l\fICHF~LS X Fill: 
PAY.:\IENT TO YOU TIIE't IL\ V~; Sl'FF! 
CIENT ORDERS IN OR PENDING TO ~IORL 
THAN COVF~R THIS.'' 
After receipt of said telegram, :\IL l'l'tt:» 1-(<l\'e :.\[iekcl-" 
Petty Innstment Company cheek Xo. l:fi8 for $12,11111 1 
which appears to he dated 9-30-62 (R. 100, Ex.±). 11 
return, Mickelson delin1 re<l the Assignmf'nt of "J[o11i 1" 
(Exhibit 5) hearing his signature arnl dated Scptemhn 
28, 1962 to !\Ir. Petty (H. 102). Thereafter, Petty Iii 
vestment Company received the sum of $-J.,000 fruli 
Gindy representing eommis:-;io11s t•arned li)· G. H. ~lick 
elson on the sale of trailNs to Interstatf' jfotor Li 111 • 
(R. 101, 149). No commissions other than such $llli
1
'
1 
"·ere earned hy ~liekelscm suhsequP11t to Se>ptrmhcr }. 
1962 (R. 149). 
In a<lcJitio11 to the foregoing statement of fad',,[, 
. I . t. ff.' f'ictnal J"rl"l 
fondant reRpectfully suhm1ts that p alll 1 s ' . , 
• , • .· lPWL' Ill ill' 
tation is inconsiste11t \nth the fads Ill <'' 11 
• 
following particulars. In the last paragraph on page 8 of 
plaintiffs' hrid ancl continuing on page 9, it is stated 
that :'If r. Petty would make the new loan to Mickelson 
011 Jv if Gin<ly would represent that it had orders from 
~firkelson out of which the $17,000 would definitely be 
paid. 'fhc e,-idence in the record is that Mr. Petty's in-
quiry of Gin<ly was directed simply to confirmation of 
the assignment offered by Mickelson. Mr. Petty's own 
testimony 011 the subject appears on pages 98 and 99 
of the record as follows: 
Q. Prior to giving him the $12,000 did you make 
an~· attempt to confirm those commissions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How, l\Ir. Petty? 
"\. I sent a wire asking if the assignment from 
Gleu jiickelson or Freeway Trailers in the 
amotmt of $17,000 would be honored, if it was 
in order. 
Q. Did you receive a reply to that telegram? 
A. Yes, promptly - very promptly . 
.. 
Q. I will show you the document, Exhibit No. 1 
in this ease, and ask you if that was the reply 
to your telegram? 
A. Y Ps, it is. 
Ia the second paragraph on page 14 and continuing 
on page 1:-i, plaintiffs state that 1\Ir. Petty asked Gindy 
for a n~presPntation that it then had on hand "orders," 
" 11 ot dC'als in process," which would produce at least 
$17,000 of rommissio11s and also that Gindy learned Mr. 
l'i·tl\ 11(1111<1 not rely on the assignment offered by 
G 
::\lickelson. A similar statemellt is eontairn1 d in the last 
fixe lines on page li. Sueh statement:,; relative to the 
substance of ::\Ir. Petty's inquiry of Ginc1y are C'ontran 
to the evidence as is clearly shown by the ahO\·e quote;] 
testimony and, furthermore, there is no eYidence in tb~ 
record that :Mr. Petty refused the assignmellt out 1.r 
hand, but rather, the evidence is that lie accepted it a11 iJ 
relied upon it as the basis of his agreeme11t with ~lickel­
son after receipt of the telegram from Gindy confirmi 11~ 
that it had sufficient orders in or l>ending to corn 1111 
same ( R. 98, 101, 102). 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED 
THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE 
DEFENDANT MADE ANY FALSE REPRE-
SENTATIONS OR INTENDED OR UNDER-
TOOK TO DECEIVE PLAINTIFFS. 
The First Count in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
sets forth a claim in fraud and deceit. The essential 
elements required to sustain such a claim are that a rep· 
resentation was made as a statement of fact, that ,url1 
representation was untrue and known to be untrue h:· 
the party making it, or was recklessly made, that it wai 
made with intent to deceive and for the purpose of in 
ducing the other party to act upon it, and that he did in 
fact rely on it to his injury or damage. 23 Am . .J'.ir 
773 Fmud and Deceit ~ 20. It is a well established pnn· 
cip{e of horn book law that the plaintiff has the bnrden of 
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pro,·ing eaeh of the required elements of fraud and that 
Jiis failure to prove any one of such elements is fatal to 
his claim. 
Jn the instant case, the plaintiffs alleged, among 
other things, that the representations contained in the 
telegram of September 28, 1962 sent by defendant's agent 
were false, were known to be false when made, and were 
made for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding plain-
tiffs. As said telegram is very brief and for the con-
renirncr of the Court, we again quote its exact language 
relier] upon hy plaintiffs in support of such allegations: 
"WILL WITHHOLD FIRST SEVENTEEN 
THOUSAND DOLLARS IN COMMISSION TO 
FREEWAY AND OR G. H. MICHELS N FOR 
PA Yl\IENT TO YOU THEY HA VE SUFFI-
CU~NT ORDERS IN OR PENDING TO MORE 
THAN COVER THIS.'' 
The trial court held that plaintiffs' evidence failed to 
pron• that such representations were false or were made 
1rith the intention of deceiving the plaintiffs. 
We snhmit that this holding by the lower court is 
orendwlmingly supported by the record. The critical 
laugunge of the telegram, in so far as a factual repre-
>entation is eoneerned, is the statement "they have suf-
fir·ieut orrlers in or pending." In analyzing such lan-
:niage, tl1e trial eourt recognized that "orders" are not 
tlif' f''!nirnlent of "sales" nor do they constitute "con-
lracts." Schaffran v. Mount Vernon-Woodberry Mills, 
iOF'. 2d 0G:i (C.C.A.N . .J. 1934). Order is defined in Funk 
8 
and \Vagnalls Nczc StaJ1dard /JicfiuJ1ary as "a commi~ 
sion or instruction to supply, negotiate for, purC'ha,e 
111 
sell something." 111 .J 111ericaJ1 S<'rrliJ1g Jlaclii 11 ,, (',, , 
'" 
('01111/UllllCC({/t/i, 1;):2 l\.y. ;JS9, l:'J:~ S.\\'. !1'12 (1!11::1, !J!.. 
court eonsidered an onll'r as ''mere]~· a11 offt.r or r~'lll''' 
hy a woul<l-he pun·hmwr to m10ther to send, sell, or ,\jj
1
, 
him the goods desired.'' \\'e submit that tlie <listineli1,: 
hl'tween the te1·ms "orders'' a11d ":-mks" a.~ the:· ,11, 
commoJ1ly used in the business eommu11ity is, or sb11uld 
be, readily apparent to the aYPrage lmsi11essman anil par 
ticularly so to one of ~Ir. Petty's expc>ripnce. Hew,, 
the repeated assumptioll in plaiHtiffs' 11ri<'f that \Ii. 
Petty was entitled to eonstruc the la11gw1ge i11 qnr,,tj,,, 
as a representation that Gill<ly had "sales" rnthn tl111:1 
just "orders" is en ti rl'ly erro1wous n rn l wit lwut ,i11,1i. 
fication. It is cxtn•mely <liffieult for us to imat:;i111· li111'. 
:\Ir. Petty, '"ith all of his experience and partil'ul:irl1 
his unfavorable experience with ~[ickcbou, pn,,i!1h 
could have failed to recognize that at least soml' uf iai 1l 
"orders" might not materialize into "sales." 
Further strengthening this eo11elusioll is the fal'I 
that the meaning imparted hy the word "orcl~rs·· wa· 
significantly qualified by the won ls '' i11 or pending· 
immediately following. Although tl1ese woril~ nn· iir· 
1 
tually ignored throughout plaintiffs' hriPf iu tlll'il' i·nli 
struction of the Septemlwr 28th te]pgram as it affeet"il 
~Ir. Petty, we suhmit that they an• n•ry importnnt ill 
the determination of the truth or falsity of Gi11d; ·, 11 11· 
• .1 • • f' tl ronl 11e11din~ resentation. The orurnan· meanrng o 10' 
l · l l or un· necessarily suggests that there \\'l'l'<' nm N'l( C'l 
9 
c<'rtai11 factors i11 c01mection with the orders in question. 
II<'nce, the telegram is simply not capable of the construc-
tiou urged hy plaintiffs that Gindy made a definite and 
alJsolntc rl'presentation it had sales from Mickelson on 
11hich he liad earned $17,000. 'rherefore, if the qual-
ifyiug language "in or pending" was not considered by 
.\Ir. Fetty, it most certainly should have been. 
Tes!illg tl1e fads against the representation actually 
made and not that now imagined by the plaintiffs, the 
e1·idc1H'l' affirmatively and very clearly demonstrates that 
tl1c: deft-mlant did in fact have "orders in or pending" 
rm Sept em lwr 28, 1962 sufficient to cover the specified 
;nuon11t. The major part of the examination of .i\Ir. 
\\'alters 11y ]Jlaintiffs' counsel, which constitutes approxi-
nrntdy two-thirds of the entire transcript of testimony, is 
d<·rnt<·d to consideration in great detail of numerous doc-
1mH'11ts n']H'Psenting and pertaining to such orders. 
Yir1red from the negative, GinJy did not represent that 
it 1rns unconditionally indebted to }Iickelson for $17,000. 
lt rlid not represent that :Mickelson had produced sales 
011 \\'hid1 hr 11ml earned $17 ,000. It did not represent 
that tlic "orders in or pending" would in fact materialize 
into 8a]e1-3 or earned commissions. The fact that some or 
ull of such orders subsequently failed to materialize into 
rnmplcll'd 8<1lL's is entirely irrelevant to the question of 
lliP trnth or falsity of the representation made. There 
iieing i10 fa]sp rrprcsenta ti on, plaintiffs' claim in fraud 
alll1 (lcrrit waR properly dismissed. 
10 
POINT II 
THF~ TRIAL COURT CORREC'fLY RULED 
THE EVIDFJNC'E PRESENTED BY PLAIN-
TIFFS "\VAS TNSUFFIC'IE~T TO SUPPORT 
A CLAIM IN CONTRACT. 
By their Second Count, plaintiffs allege a claim based 
upon hreach of agreement. The telegram of SeptemhPr 
28, 1962 is relie<l upon as the 'uitten agreemrnt. It j, 
readily apparent from the evidence that such telegram 
does not constitute' a binding contract as alleged by plair: 
tiffs for two reasons: first, there is no consideration to 
Gindy, the party claimed to he hound hy the \\riti11~: 
and second, the language of the telegram does not co1: 
stitutc an ahsolutc promise or agreement to pay Peth 
Investment Company the sum of $11,000. Xeitlwr j, 
it capable of construction as a guarantee. We suhmi1 
that these deficiencies arc sufficiently self-evident tl1at ii 
requires no citation of authority or helahori11g tlH' argu-
ment to conclude that there was no formal rontraet 
This conclusion is apparently conceded hy plaintiffs a> 
their brief makes no attempt to sustain their original 
claim of breach of contract. 
While the telegram does not constitute a l'Ontrnf't 
between the parties herein, we do not dispute that it do1' 
constitute acknowledgment of :rn assig-nme11t from 11 
third party. To the extent that l\fiekrlson or hi' e~r­
poration Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc. earnrd comnu>-
' 1 · 1· " G · ],, ·1gree1l t
11 
sions on the ' on ers rn or penc mg, i-rnc. 'c 
pay such commissions over to Petty in acrordanrc with 
the instructions from "'.\Eckelson. Pursuant to such agrc·<· 
11 
ment, Girnly <lid pay Petty Investment Company the 
$4,000 commission on the sale to Interstate Motor Lines. 
Viewing the legal relationship between the parties as 
tlwt of 11s.-.;ig11ee-assig11or, the trial rourt eorrectly found 
tha( plaintiffs offered no evi<lenee whatever that Gin<ly 
had paid any commissions to .:\Iiekelson or Freeway 
rnthf'r than to Petty, nor that Gindy was holding any 
commissions due .:\Iickelson or Freeway. .:\Iickelson him-
srlf did not daim Gindy owed him m1ything. Hence, 
Giudy ill no way violated its agreement to honor and 
··omply with the assignment given by .:\Iickelson to Petty 
[11\'cstment Company. 
Jn thPir brief, plaintiffs assert the further theory 
tl1al tlie rourt should hold Gindy responsible to Petty for 
c1 1nl1llissio11s on certain orders which failed to materialize 
into ,,;iJes because Gindy refused to consummate the 
lrn11sactions. The burden of this argument is that Mick-
1~bon produeed purehasers ready, willing and able to buy 
and tliat Gindy, without justification, refused to sell 
to tJiem. \Vhile the principle thus stated might be true 
as a gclleral proposition, it is simply not applicable to 
tlie farts of this case. 
The specific situations referred to by plqintiffs are 
11ot simply eases of Mickelson submitting orders provid-
ing for C'ash payment on <leliYery. Rather, the orders in 
question were submitted subject to the purchaser ob-
tai11i11g rredit terms and many of these transactions be-
eame rxtremely eomplicated because of the large amount 
of im rstment required for the type of equipment in-
n·l\'e<l and tl1c nPcPssity of adequately securing those 
12 
parties proYiding the financing. Such was thr casr· of 
the large Peebles order relied upon hy plaintiffs in thi, 
connection ( R. ll:i-l'.20). Furthermore., the l'1·i1J1•11 eP 
shows that \\·here eredit \1·as illYOlYed, Oirnl~· eitJ 11.r 
proYided the financing itself or placed it with one of ib 
hanking connections ?Cit71 rrr:oursc (R. 125, 126). 
Hence, when l\fickelson suhmitted orders requiri 11 ~ 
credit from Girnly in order to accomplish the sale, it rnM 
certainly was Gincly's prerogatiYe to exereise ib inrl~­
pendent judgment before extending crerlit thr same a' 
if no distributor were inrnked. \VhateYer dutie.~ Gind,r 
may han had to its distributor, they nnque~tionabh 
did not include an ahsolut0 obligation to ext~111l 
credit to any third party the (1istributor happene<l tfl r111i. 
duce. Plaintiffs' argument that Gindy's i1wo1YrmPnt iu 
this aspect of the matter \Yas none of its bnsillP:<R awl 
that it was unwarranted in delaying complPtion of thP 
transactions in question until the would-he pnrrhascr sat-
isfied Girnl>·'s conditions for obtaining the Jll'('CR"HY 
credit is not onl>· erroneous hnt preposterous. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF PROl\IIASORY 
ESTOPPEL IS IN APPLICABLE 'rOO THE 
INSTANT CASE SINCE DEFENDANT PER-
FORMED THE ONLY PROl\fISE WHICH IT 
~LADE TO PLA TNTIFFS. 
As pointed out earlier, the plaintiffl' plan• primnn 
. . l . j . f' l n (>JltircJY ]10\\' reliance lll t 1eir Jl'le Oil 11Jlpea 011 nll · 
. l Tl ' .. a r"nnir11t theorv of tl1e case, promissory estoppc. Hll ' " 
-
13 
as.,ertiug this theory is i11itially predicated on Section 90 
of the Hestatemcut of Contracts (1932) which reads as 
follo11'S: 
".l promise which the promissor should rea-
so11ably expect to induce action or forbearance 
of a defi11ite and substantial character on the part 
of the promisee and which does induce such ac-
tion or forbearance is binding if injustice can be 
aYoided only by the enforcement of the promise." 
\re submit that this doctrine ean be readily disposed of 
a-; iwq>pli('ahlc in the instant case hy a simple analysis 
of its purpose awl operation. From the language quoted 
alion:. the apparent purpose of the doctrine of promis-
,;riry estoppcl is to enforce, under certain eircumstances, 
promises misupportPd by consideration in order to pre-
1c>11t i11ju:-:tiee otherwise unavoidable. 
1n ;itfc·mpting to sustain their position by the appli-
rntion of this <loctrine, plaintiffs assume throughout their 
nrgument that Gindy made a promise which it failed or 
refused to perform. This fallacious assumption entirely 
i~llorrs the fundamental question presented by this 
appeal. For if Gindy made no promise, or performed any 
promise which it did ill fact make, then it necessarily fol-
1011~ that the doctrine in Section 90 of the Restatement 
l1a.-; no application whateYer by definition. Hence, this 
iirings ns squart>ly back to the yery questions considered 
in Poiuts I ancl II a boYe. 
Without n•peating all of the arguments, we helie\'e 
that they more than amply demonstrate tlrnt Ginc1y com-
pliril l'nlly 11 itl1 the only promise it made which was to 
14 
pay over to Petty the first $17,000 of commissio11s ('al'Jiei] 
by l\Iickelson or Freeway. This is not a case of Gindi 
promising Petty it would pay the said sum in any r 1, 1;1 
and then refusing to perform after Petty had acted j11 
reliance thereon. If such were the facts, consith•ration of 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel "·ould he rrachl'rl. 
Instead, the facts are that Gincly did exactly what it ~aid 
it would do even though there was no consideration for 
its agreement. There being no unfulfilled promisr, ther0 
is no injustice to prevent and no need or occasion !1.1 
appl~· an estoppel. Hence, promissory estoppcl and 8r11· 
tion 90 of the restatement are simply not applicalJ!1• to 
this case and thP even more difficult questions discn.~.'Pd 
in plaintiffs' brief, such as whether or not promi~,on 
estoppel can be applied to a promise of fnturr• co111l11:· 
and whether or not such a promise must eon~1itutr' ;1 
manifestation that the promissor intends to aharnlon :1•1 
existing right 'd1ich he possesses, are neYer rrarlml. 
'rhis conclusion is well illustrated hy the entirely 1fo-
tinguishahle fact situations of the cases cited a111l relil'il 
upon in plaintiffs' brief. The case of Seyn1011r Y. Oclricl1s. 
156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 ( 1910), invoked an employmen1 
contract for a period of ten years where the dcfenrlRnt' 
had promised to put the agreement in writing but failed 
to do so after the plaintiff had acted in relianee tltereo 11 
lT pm1 heing discharged, the plaintiff hrought arti1111 nn 
the oral promise and promissory estoppcl "·as irnokerl 
to estop the defendants from asserting the statute of 
. ti f. ,]iielrl frarn1s as a clefense m order to prevent wm rorn · 
· 1 · f ·1 t l tl · ·v thiil" !hr' rn,s; t1H'mse1Yes hy t l('ff al nre 0 ( n IC '<'I. ~ . 
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promised. Rarnri1w v. Price et al., 123 Utah 559, 260 P. 
~d 310 (103:3) involved an oral promise of a landowner 
to sign m1 Earnest .Jloney Receipt for the sale of real 
pmprrty all<l to eomplete the sale as proposed. 'rhe de-
t'endauts again plead the statute of frauds as a defensE·. 
111 Easton\'. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P. 2d 332 (1956) 
:lie rn1fnlfil10d urnl promise opposed by the same defense 
\laR failure to draw and execute a written lease agree-
ment \rhieh \rnnld comply ·with the statute of frauds pur-
,;nant to terms orally agreed upon by the parties. 
ln the language of the plaintiff's brief, the purpose 
r,f prorni.~.;;u1y l'stoppel is fraud prevention. ·we submit 
ilrnt since the defendant fulfilled its only promise there is 
11fJ frnucl to pren"11t .• \s this court stated in Papanikolas 
ef al. Y. ,')'a11111son et al., 13 Utah 404, 274 P. 586 (1929) 
1111otiug- from 1:2 R.C.L. 11p. 237, 238, "There can be no 
fraud '' !1cre tlwre is 11othing wrong, and fraud cannot be 
rlrilu~l'd 01' i11fcrre<l from that \\'hich the law pronounces 
honest.'' Henec, the plaintiffs herein are not entitled to 
relic·f mu1er the theory of promissory estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
f11 conclusion, the defendant submits that the answer 
tr, onp l1asic question liere presented is dispositiYe of all 
three of tl1e alte>rnative theories of fraud a11d deceit, 
r·ontrnd aucl promissory estoppel advanced by plain-
tiffr. Tl1c· 11ut>stio11 is: ·wiwt did Gindy promise or agree 
I(\ rlo hy 1hr telegram of September 28, 1062? ·we submit 
that tl1P P\·idPJH'P clearly shows that Gi11dy did 110 more 
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than agree to honor an assignment from G. H. :Micke!s011 
by withholding from the assignor and paying over to htty 
Investment Company the first $17,000 of commission' 
earned by G. H. Mickelson or Freeway Trailer Salei, 
Inc. Since Gindy has fully performed such agreement, 
plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under any of tlw ~1trr­
native theories. Therefore, the defendant respectful!> 
urges that the decision of the lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MALCOL.'.\I D. PIKE of 
VAN CoTT, BAGLEY, CoRNW ALL & T\IcC\nrm 
Suite 300, 141 East First Routh 
Salt Lake City, U tali 
Attorneys for Def cndant-Respondenl 
